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Abstract
Background: The Kenyan government has sought to address inadequacies in its National Pharmaceutical Policy
and the Pharmacy and Poisons Board’s (PPB) medicines governance by engaging with global actors (e.g. the World
Health Organization). Policy actors have influenced the way pharmacovigilance is defined, how challenges are
understood and which norms are requisite to address drug safety issues. In this paper, we investigate the
relationship between specific modes of engagement among global (exogenous) and domestic actors at the
national and sub-national level to identify the positive or negative effect on pharmacovigilance and
pharmacogovernance in Kenya. Pharmacogovernance is defined as the manner in which governing structures;
policy instruments; institutional authority (e.g., ability to act, implement and enforce norms, policies and processes)
and resources are managed to promote societal interests for patient safety and protection from adverse drug
reactions (ADRs). Qualitative research methods that included key informant interviews and document analysis, were
employed to investigate the relationship between global actors’ patterns of engagement with national actors and
pharmacogovernance in Kenya.
Results: Global actors’ influence on pharmacogovernance and pharmacovigilance priorities in Kenya (e.g.,
legislation and adverse drug reaction surveillance) was positively perceived by key informants. We found that global
actors’ engagement with state actors produced positive and negative outcomes. Engagement with the PPB and
Ministry of Health (MOH) that was characterized as dependent (advocacy, empowerment, delegated) or
interdependent (collaborative, cooperative, consultative) was mostly associated with positive outcomes e.g.,
capacity building; strengthening legislation and stakeholder coordination. Fragmentation (independent
engagement) hindered risk communication between public, private, and NGO health programs.
Conclusion: A framework for assessing pharmacogovernance would support policy makers’ evidence-based
decision making regarding investments to strengthen capacity for pharmacovigilance and guide policies regarding
the state and exogenous actor relationship pertaining to pharmacogovernance. Ideally, dependency on exogenous
actors should be reduced while retaining consultative, collaborative, and cooperative engagement when
inter-dependency is appropriate. The use of global actors to address Kenya’s pharmacovigilance inadequacies
leaves the country vulnerable to 1) ad hoc drug surveillance; 2) pharmacovigilance fragmentation; 3) shifting
priorities; and 4) cross purpose interests.
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Background
Pharmacogovernance is essential to policy choices (or
lack thereof ), infrastructure, institutional authority and
resources to address pharmaceutical safety and safeguard
public health. It is defined as the manner in which
governing structures; policy instruments; institutional
authority (e.g., ability to act, implement and enforce
norms, policies and processes) and resources are man-
aged to promote societal interests for patient safety and
protection from adverse drug reactions (ADRs) [1].
Weak pharmacogovernance negatively affects patient
safety because it can lead to a failure to adopt legislation
and norms for pharmacovigilance resulting in poor
quality medicines in the supply chain. It is costly when
limited healthcare resources are wasted on increasing
medicines costs; some of which may be unsafe or
ineffective [2–5].
In Kenya, the Ministry of Health is responsible for
governing the safety of medicines. The Ministry dele-
gates this responsibility specifically to one of its institu-
tions - the Pharmacy and Poisons Board (PPB). The PPB
was established by Parliament in 1957 under the Phar-
macy and Poisons Act, Chapter 244 [6]. It is a semi-
independent regulatory authority [7]. The PPB’s stated
mission is to ‘safeguard the health of the public by
ensuring that medicines and health products comply
with acceptable standards of quality, safety and efficacy’
[8]. PPB’s mission complements the Kenya Health Policy
and the Constitution of Kenya which expresses that
‘every person has the right to the highest attainable
standard of health’ [Kenya Bill of Rights Article 43
(1)(a)], and ‘consumers have the right (a) to goods and
services of reasonable quality; (b) to the information
necessary for them to gain full benefit from goods and
services; (c) to the protection of their health, safety, and
economic interests’ [Bill of Rights Article 46 (1)] [9, 10].
Kenya’s National Drug Policy, Pharmacy and Poisons
Act [Rev. 2012], Food, Drug and Chemical Substance
Act [Rev. 2012] (FDCSA), and Public Health Act are the
key policy and enabling legislation regulating pharma-
ceuticals in Kenya.
The allocation of financial and human resources
needed to support patient safety and protect the public
from ADRs is another key component of pharmacogo-
vernance. The PPB can generate revenues to support its
activities by collecting fees from pharmaceutical com-
panies for licensing and product registration as permit-
ted by the Pharmacy and Poisons Act. The PPB also
receives funding from the national government and ad
hoc contributions from international actors such as the
European Commission and United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) [11, 12]. Human
resources are not apportioned equally to PPB’s six
Directorates. Staffing is greatest in the Directorates of
Business Support (46) and Pharmaceutical Inspectorate,
Surveillance, and Enforcement (62). In contrast, fewer
staff are allocated to the Directorates of Medicine
Information and Pharmacovigilance (5) and Quality
Control (2) [11]. Each Directorate is allocated an op-
erating budget by PPB. Some Directorates receive
greater funding than others depending on PPB and
Ministry of Medical Services priorities. The percent-
age of PPB’s funding that is allocated to pharmacov-
igilance is unknown. Funding levels needed to meet
PPB’s strategic goals for pharmacovigilance are not
reported in the Pharmacy and Poisons Board Strategic
Plan 2014–2019 [11].
Pharmacogovernance and exogenous actors in Kenya
The Kenyan National Pharmaceutical Policy calls for
international collaboration and effective partnerships
to address pharmaceutical sector issues and to safe-
guard public health and safety’ [13]. The policy is
aligned with Kenya’s national governance that permits
the delegation of authority to exogenous (external and
non-state) actors to create infrastructure and imple-
ment domestic programs that increase national capacity
to provide services. They comprise two of the three
pillars of the Kenya Health Sector Strategic and Invest-
ment Plan (KHSSP) implementation framework: state
actors, non-state actors, and external actors [7]. Exter-
nal actors (e.g., bilateral, multilateral, or philanthropic
actors), non-state actors (e.g., faith-based organizations,
civil society organizations and nongovernmental
organizations [NGOs]), international NGOs (INGOs)
and not-for-profit NGOs are described in the Kenya
Health Sector Strategic and Investment Plan (KHSSP)
as ‘crucial partners, both as a financial resource for the
health sector and as a way of ensuring programme
delivery competencies’ (p.31) to augment limited do-
mestic human resources in the Kenya Health Policy
2012–2030 strategic vision [7, 10].
In 2014, there were more than 7000 NGOs re-
gistered in Kenya; most were funded by international
donors [14, 15]. NGOs and faith-based organizations
provided approximately 14% of health care services
in Kenya [16–18]. Other providers of health care
services in Kenya are public institutions run by the
government (e.g., the Ministry of Health, military,
prisons, or state corporations), private facilities,
academic institutions and parastatals. The majority
of Kenya’s health facilities are public institutions
(48%) or private facilities (37%) [17]. Exogenous ac-
tors influencing pharmaceutical policy and programs
in Kenya include the World Health Organization
(WHO), United States Agency for International De-
velopment (USAID) and Management Sciences for
Health (MSH) [19].
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Exogenous actors: benefits
The government of Kenya has sought engagement
with exogenous actors to address some of the weak-
nesses of the country’s National Pharmaceutical Policy
and PPB’s pharmacogovernance in order to combat
deficiencies that leave the country vulnerable to sub-
standard, spurious, falsely labelled, falsified and coun-
terfeit (SSFFC) medicines entering the supply chain.
This strategy is a rational one given that dealing with
SSFFCs is an issue that goes well beyond one nation’s
borders and requires collective action on the part of
many stakeholders. For example, in 2011, SSFFC
drugs found in Kenya’s supply chain included the oral
contraceptive Postinor-2® (levonorgestrol) and 15,000
of batches of the antiretroviral Zidolam-N® (zidovu-
dine) [20]. What is troubling about this example is
that the SSFFC antiretroviral medicines that entered
the supply chain were not distributed by nefarious
groups but rather inadvertently distributed to patients
by Médicins Sans Frontières [21].
Kenya has therefore engaged with global actors to in-
crease its capacity to identify SSFFCs, analyze drug
safety signals and enhance risk communication [6, 22].
Their resources contributed to advancements in post-
market drug safety by supporting the development of
ADR reporting tools (e.g. USAID funding to develop
PPB’s online ADR reporting system) and pharmacovigi-
lance training to build capacity for pharmacosurveillance
[6]. NGO’s technical support and financial resources
enabled active pharmacosurveillance employing cohort
event monitoring (CEM) and targeted spontaneous
reporting (TSR) (e.g., the Academic Model Providing
Access to Healthcare [AMPATH] pharmacosurveillance
program at Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital in
Eldoret, Kenya). Donor-run health programs have en-
hanced pharmacovigilance because the programs have
pharmacovigilance requirements not mandated by the
public sector [22].
Exogenous actors such as the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) African Medicines Re-
gulatory Harmonization (AMRH) Programme have
contributed to regulatory governance through the cre-
ation of Regional Centres of Regulatory Excellence
(RCOREs). In 2014, the Kenya Pharmacy and Poisons
Board was designated a RCORE for pharmacovi-
gilance. Kenya is also a member of the East African
Community (EAC) which advocates for harmonization
and regulatory convergence pertaining to pharmacov-
igilance [23].
Exogenous actors: risks
There is generally good will among state and NGO
actors who are perceived as instrumental in implement-
ing policy and programs in Kenya [14]. Olsson, Dodoo
and Pal (2015) positively describe numerous examples of
global actors’ interventions to catalyze awareness of
pharmacovigilance and expand capacity for pharma-
covigilance. However, the parallel donor-run health
programs that are positively received for mandating
pharmacovigilance are also described as negatively con-
tributing to fragmentation in the health system [13]. A
key governance challenge, cited in the Sessional Paper
for Kenya’s National Pharmaceutical Policy, is over-
coming a ‘lack of effective coordination leading to
fragmentation and duplication’ of services which is
coupled with ‘inadequate technical oversight of private,
mission and NGO pharmaceutical service providers’
[13]. Parallel systems for collecting data about ADRs
and adverse vaccine reactions coupled with poor data
exchange and communication hinder comprehensive
pharmacovigilance in many low- and middle income
countries [22].
Theoretical framework
We employ Network Governance Theory to explain
how and why state and exogenous actors form net-
works in order to advance postmarket drug safety
in Kenya. Network Governance Theory proposes that
stakeholders may form policy networks to address
complex problems that are uncertain, require spe-
cialized knowledge, are multi-jurisdictional and have
high potential for risk or conflict which members
perceive are best solved collectively [24]. Network
Governance Theory is germane to pharmacogo-
vernance in Kenya where a network of relevant
stakeholders contributes to shared policy making.
Pharmacogovernance policy and practice are shaped
by networks of domestic and global actors who
have an influence on the way pharmacovigilance is
defined, how challenges are understood and which
norms are requisite to address drug safety issues
[24, 25]. Many of the exogenous actors that con-
tribute to pharmacogovernance in Kenya are the
same non-state and external actors outlined in the
KHSSP implementation framework. They contribute
to governance through their representation in the
Kenya Aid Effectiveness Group (AEG). The AEG is
comprised of representatives of the Government of
Kenya (GoK) and 17 development partners from 13
countries and the European Commission, the United
Nations and the World Bank Group [26]. The AEG
serves as a platform for exogenous actors to con-
tribute to governance in Kenya by guiding the joint
development GoK-development partner framework
for addressing and monitoring issues of mutual ac-
countability [26]. Intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs), technical INGOs and philanthropic organi-
zations contributing to pharmacogovernance include:
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Management Sciences for Health, the World Health
Organization, Mission for Essential Drugs, Health
Action International- Africa, the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Regional Centers
for Regulatory Excellence and pharmaceutical com-
panies. Their contribution to assessment of Kenya’s
pharmaceutical sector influenced the draft Guidelines
for Kenya’s National Pharmacovigilance System, in-
formed drug safety policies and recommendations for
the establishment of training centres for pharmacov-
igilance governance and advocacy for legislation to
advance pharmacovigilance (Table 1) [6, 19, 27].
Network actor relationships
Exogenous actors have the potential to continue in-
fluencing pharmacogovernance in Kenya given their
strong participation in health policy networks. The
state-NGO’s relationship however is in a state of
flux. The NGO Coordination Act, which was enacted in
1990 and revised in 2012 to coordinate the work of
national and international NGOs operating in Kenya,
increase oversight, reduce fragmentation in the health-
care system and provide policy guidelines regarding
harmonization of activities for the national develop-
ment plan for Kenya, through a NGO Coordination
Board, was repealed and replaced by the Public Benefit
Organization (PBO) Act, passed January, 2013 [28].
The PBO Act provides clear definitions for what is and
is not a PBO and what type of activities that PBOs can
and cannot engage in. PBO activities include: enhancing
or promoting the economic, environmental, social or
cultural development or protecting the environment or
lobbying or advocating on issues of general public
interest or the interest or well-being of the general
public or a category of individuals or organizations
[29]. While the country continues to recognize ‘the
importance of mutual co-existence and the need to work
together [with NGOs]’ [29], editorials have suggested
that the Kenyan government has been pushing forward
constitutional amendments such as the new PBO Act,
to ‘shrink the political and legal space in which they
operate’ [30].
A framework for understanding the state and exo-
genous actor relationships pertaining to pharmacogo-
vernance is critical, given Kenya’s past and current
dependence on exogenous actors as implementing
partners. We thus investigated the relationships
between specific modes of engagement amongst ex-
ogenous and domestic actors at the national and
subnational level to identify the positive or negative
effect on pharmacogovernance and pharmacovigi-
lance. The research question addressed through this
study is: Which pattern(s) of engagement among
exogenous actors, the Kenya Pharmacy and Poisons
Board and county actors enable or hinder pharmaco-
governance and pharmacovigilance?
We analyzed dependent, independent, and inter-
dependent patterns of engagement amongst state and
exogenous in Kenya. We defined dependency as relying
on others for financial or other support. Dependency is
an asymmetrical relationship whereby global and domes-
tic actors with resources and political power are able to
influence policies and processes in tandem with or in
conflict with the interests of lessor resourced local
groups [31]. Independence was defined as not depending
on another's authority or resources for support. In inter-
dependent modes of engagement each partner benefits
by reliance on the other. Interdependence between actors
may be equal and mutually dependent (symmetrical) or
asymmetrical [32]. The actions or national policies of
one partner are perceived to have a direct effect on the
other members, although the policies may benefit part-
ners disproportionately [32]. Kenya is a robust example
to examine because of the numerous internationally
funded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operat-
ing in the country and their high level of integration into
Kenya’s governance [14].
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we provide
background regarding pharmacogovernance and global
actors in Kenya. Second, we describe our research
methods. Third, we analyze exogenous actors’ motiv-
ation for engaging with state actors to advance pharma-
covigilance and pharmacogovernance. Fourth, state and
exogenous actors’ perceptions of pharmacogovernance
and drug safety are analyzed. Finally, the patterns of
engagement between state and exogenous actors are
characterized and analyzed.
Methods
Key informant interviews and a documentary analysis
were conducted to investigate the patterns of engage-
ment between state and exogenous actors affecting
pharmacogovernance and pharmacovigilance in Kenya.
Purposive and reputational sampling strategies were
employed to select participants able to provide rich data
about pharmacovigilance systems in Kenya. The par-
ticipants were identified via a ‘snow-balling’ process.
Thirteen key informants were interviewed which repre-
sented the calculated quota sample. Quota sampling is a
non-probablistic sampling method used to determine
the minimum representative sample size [33]. In this
case study, a quota sample representing location (rural,
urban), pharmacovigilance resources (high resourced, low
resourced) and sector representation (regulatory), govern-
ment (national, external [IGO]), pharmaceutical manu-
facturer, non-state actor, non-governmental organization
(national, international) was interviewed. The key infor-
mants included representatives of the Kenya medicines
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Table 1 Exogenous actors contributing to pharmacogovernance
Exogenous actors Governance network Agency Pharmacogovernance in Kenya
External actors
Denmark AEG, SWG Danish International
Development Agency
• Kenya National Pharmaceutical
Policy- 2008 [14]
• Framework for addressing and
monitoring issues of
accountability [13]
Germany AEG Deutsche Gesellschaft für
Technische Zusammenarbeit
• Framework for addressing and
monitoring issues of
accountability [13]
Japan AEG, SWG Japanese International Cooperation
Agency
• Corporate governance and technical,
financial support
• Framework for addressing and
monitoring issues of
accountability [13]
United Kingdom AEG Department for International
Development [UK]
• Kenya National Pharmaceutical
Policy- 2008 [14]
• Framework for addressing and
monitoring issues of
accountability [13]
United Nations AEG, SWG United Nations Children's Fund,
United Nations Population Fund
• Corporate governance and technical,
financial support [11]
• Framework for addressing and
monitoring issues of
accountability [13]
United States AEG, SWG United States Agency for International
Development, US President’s Emergency





• Corporate governance and technical,
financial support [11]
• Framework for addressing and
monitoring issues of
accountability [13]
European Commission AEG Monitoring Medicines Project FP7 • Kenya National Pharmaceutical
Policy- 2008 [14]
• Normative framework for
pharmacosurveillence [44]
• Framework for addressing and
monitoring issues of
accountability [13]
World Bank AEG World Bank • Assessment of the pharmaceutical
sector and support for updating
policy
frameworks [14]
• Corporate governance and technical,
financial support [11]
Global Fund Global Fund • Corporate governance and technical,
financial support [11]
• Pharmacovigilance norms [17, 45]
New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD)
AMRH AMRH • Regional Centre for Regulatory
Excellence in Pharmacovigilance
[11, 15]
Management Sciences for Health PPB and
MoH SAGs,
County HMT
United States Agency for
International Development
• Kenya National Pharmaceutical
Policy- 2008 [14]
• Kenya National Pharmacovigilance
Guidelines- Draft [6]
Non-state actors
World Health Organization (WHO) HSWG, PPB and
MoH SAGs
World Health Organization (WHO) • Kenya National Pharmacovigilance
Guidelines- Draft [6]
• Kenya National Pharmaceutical
Policy- 2008 [14]
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regulatory authority (Pharmacy and Poisons Board),
multinational and domestic pharmaceutical corpora-
tions, IGOs/INGOs and pharmacy and Kenyan go-
vernment representatives from Turkana County, Uasin
Gishu County, Mombasa County and Kwale County.
The county key informants that were interviewed rep-
resented a convenience sample of information-rich in-
dividuals from urban and rural counties. The sample
was selected to characterize regional differences in
pharmacogovernance and pharmacovigilance in Kenya.
See Table 2.
Interviews were conducted in person or by SKYPE
between March 2014 and January 2015 following ethics
approval from the University of Toronto, Canada and
Moi University, Kenya. Informed consent including con-
sent to publish the information they provided was ob-
tained from study participants. Interviews were conducted
until saturation of themes was reached. All interviews
were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim.
Interview data and publicly available government doc-
uments (e.g., the Kenya constitution (2010), the Phar-
macy and Poisons Act and the NGO Coordination Act),
peer reviewed and grey literature and newspapers ar-
chives were read iteratively. Data were coded into key
themes employing an open coding process using Atlas ti
v. 7.5.9 (2015) qualitative software. Data coding and re-
coding was an ongoing process as new and more refined
patterns of engagement between exogenous and state ac-
tors emerged [34]. A codebook with operational defini-
tions was created to maintain consistency in the coding
process (Appendix A).
A semantic analysis of key informant transcripts was also
conducted. A semantic analysis investigates how words are
used in context and their relationship to one another [34].
Words used by key informants to describe their perceptions
of pharmacovigilance priorities at federal, county, and cor-
porate levels; governance related to the priority setting
process; the nature of interactions among global, national,
county and municipal actors pertaining to pharmacovigi-
lance were analyzed. An analysis of linguistic connectors
used by key informants, provided insight into their perspec-
tives of causality (‘because’), conditional relations (‘since’),
contingent relations (‘if-then, rather than’; ‘as soon as’) and
temporal relations (‘before, now’) related to how, when and
why state and exogenous actors interacted pertaining to
pharmacogovernance [34].
Results
Exogenous actors’ motivation for advancing
pharmacovigilance in Kenya
The semantic analysis of key informants interviewed
suggested that exogenous actors have begun to
prioritize pharmacovigilance. According to one IGO/
INGO interviewed, “there are very many good reasons
to expand and extend the coverage of pharmacovigi-
lance because the chance of finding rare adverse reac-
tions is directly proportional to the population exposed
and the danger that is being gathered. In terms of the
variability of the problems, they will look very different
Table 1 Exogenous actors contributing to pharmacogovernance (Continued)
• Assessment of the pharmaceutical
sector and support for updating
policy frameworks [14]
• Pharmacovigilance norms [17]
Uppsala Monitoring Centre (UMC-Sweden);
WHO Collaborating Centre for Advocacy




WHO International Centre for
Drug Monitoring
• Kenya National Pharmacovigilance
Guidelines- Draft [6]
International NGOs
Mission for Essential Drugs (MEDS) PPB and
MoH SAGs






HAI- Africa • Kenya National Pharmacovigilance
Guidelines- Draft [6]
Pharmaceutical Industry PPB and/or
MoH SAGs
Various drug companies • Policy, law and regulation
(QPPV, PSUR) [5, 6]
(AEG) Aid Effectiveness Group, (SWG) Health Sector Working Groups, (HMT) Health Management Team, (PPB) Pharmacy and Poisons Board, (MoH) Ministry of
Health, (SAGs) Stakeholder Advisory Groups, (QPPV) Qualified Person for Pharmacovigilance, (PSUR) Periodic Safety Update Report
Table 2 Characterization of key informants interviewed
#Key Informants Interviewed Sector Region
2 Regulatory National
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in different populations and different cultural situa-
tions (IGO/INGO-2). For this reason, they have
funded active surveillance studies as well as pharma-
covigilance training. As a member of the Uppsala
Monitoring Centre, PPB has received access to data
analyses of case reports and the Vigibase® data man-
agement system. Although historically their prior-
ities for commodities management have focused on
access rather than pharmacovigilance, the global
actors that were interviewed actively advocated for
pharmacovigilance within the programs that they
managed because “…you can see basically that’s com-
modities management. Pharmacovigilance is just one
[part] of it. I talk passionately when I advocate for phar-
macovigilance. I say that we have to match ACCESS with
SAFETY” (IGO/INGO-5).
International donors’ priorities for pharmacovigi-
lance have influenced domestic priorities at the regu-
latory authority and county level. Input from the
WHO contributed to the expansion of the Pharmacy
and Poisons Board priorities to include medicines
safety [13].
“There was a time when we [only] wanted medicines
to be available. That was the biggest want. But now
we want to go past the availability debate to the safety
of these drugs.”- PPB-1
“There could be [a relationship between priorities for
pharmacovigilance in the county and global actors]
because many times when we conduct this postmarket
surveillance we are funded. So there could be a
connection in that these donors might be funding
it.” - County-4
Exogenous actors’ engagement with the Government
and the Pharmacy and Poisons Board has focused on
strengthening pharmacogovernance in Kenya to enhance
postmarket drug safety. An Indicator-based Pharmacovigi-
lance Assessment Tool (IPAT) was developed by USAID/
MSH [35] and in 2015, the WHO published an up-to-date
comprehensive tool for assessing pharmacovigilance sys-
tems [36]. In addition to guidelines for pharmacovigilance
system assessment [37], they have supported the estab-
lishment of pharmacovigilance centres in Kenya, and
other countries in Africa; disseminating their policy norms
through them.
“Our work plan is also strengthening those that have
come on board or there is no point in being on board.
And, helping them with systems issues like policies…
So I came to them championing partnerships where
they are drumming up support from those around
them.” -IGO/INGO-3
State and exogenous actors’ perceptions of
pharmacogovernance and drug safety
Pharmacogovernance affects governing structures; insti-
tutional authority; implementation of law and policy;
enforcement of laws, norms, policies and processes; and
resources to advance drug safety.
The results of our semantic analysis revealed that
key informants’ perceptions of the relationship be-
tween governance and pharmacovigilance converged
regarding the desire for harmonization of policy and
laws for drug approval and postmarket requirements.
Key informants’ perceptions regarding other facets of
pharmacogovernance varied according to type of actor
interviewed. International NGOs used the most words to
describe governance; reflecting their perception of its im-
portance. The importance of good governance is also
widely disseminated in their literature [19, 38–40]. A code
of ethics to prevent corruption, good manufacturing pro-
cesses, spontaneous ADR reporting and sentinel reporting
sites are described as requisites of good governance pertain-
ing to pharmaceuticals [37, 38, 40]. Words that were used
by IGO/INGOs in their response to interview questions
about governance included accountability, transparency,
budgets and funding, autonomy, leadership, contracts, rules
and directives.
The words that PPB key informants used in their
response to interview questions related to governance
reflects their perception that achieving their mission ‘to
safeguard the health of the public by ensuring that medi-
cines and health products comply with acceptable stan-
dards of quality, safety and efficacy’ is affected by the
National Pharmaceutical Policy, institutional authority
and capacity. Kenya’s pharmaceutical sector has been
characterized as having a weak infrastructure, conflicting
laws and weak enforcement of laws governing phar-
maceuticals [13, 19]. Enforcement of pharmacovigi-
lance has been challenged because “the law is not
explicit on pharmacovigilance issues” (PPB 02). The
words that representatives of PPB used related to
governance included constitution, policy, budget and
revenue. The emphasis on resources reflects the per-
ception that current budget and staffing for pharma-
covigilance is insufficient to cover pharmacovigilance,
postmarket surveillance, and medicines information
for 2 million Kenyans (PPB-01).
Pharmaceutical representatives interviewed held diver-
gent perceptions of their companies’ responsibility for
pharmacogovernance. In regards to accountability for
drug safety, all of the pharmaceutical representatives that
were interviewed perceived that their primary responsi-
bility was to adhere to corporate pharmacovigilance
policies. They perceived it was in their companies’ in-
terest to influence PPB norms and policies pertaining to
ADR reporting. The words used by pharmaceutical
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companies to describe governance emphasized policy
and standard operating procedures.
“So with the corporate governance we’ve got policies
and procedures, worldwide policy and procedures,
we’ve got SOPs that are global.”- Pharma-1
Only one of the pharmaceutical company representa-
tives interviewed highlighted the importance of a corpor-
ate governance policy for company-wide participation in
pharmacovigilance.
Patterns of interactions among state, non-state, and
external actors’ influencing pharmacogovernance and
pharmacovigilance
We analyzed the patterns of engagement between
exogenous and state actors and found examples of
dependent (advocacy, delegation, empowerment and
hierarchy), independent (autonomy and fragmenta-
tion) and interdependent (collaboration, cooperation,
and consultation) patterns of engagement. Dependent
and interdependent patterns of engagement were
found to be associated with strengthening pharma-
covigilance through capacity building; pharmacovigi-
lance priority setting; advocacy for policy, law, or
regulation; stakeholder coordination; and local em-
powerment for pharmacovigilance. Delegation was
associated with strengthening pharmacovigilance with
respect to exogenous actors’ aim to develop Pharmacy
and Poisons Board into a regional actor for pharmacov-
igilance for the purpose of transferring to Kenya the
responsibility for building regional capacity. The effect
of specific modes of engagement on pharmacogover-
nance is shown in Table 3.
Interactions strengthening pharmacogovernance
Exogenous actors have both catalyzed and strength-
ened some of the proposed changes to pharmaceutical
policies, laws and regulations in Kenya [6, 10, 19].
They engaged in advocacy with government, Phar-
macy and Poisons Board and other non-state stake-
holders to shape PPB and Ministry of Health policy
preferences regarding the Pharmacy and Poisons Act
Amendment and adoption of a National Pharma-
covigilance System. They have engaged in consultative
interactions for the purpose of sharing information
about pending legislation and changes in existing
legislation.
“[We] liaise with government to get to know what
needs to be done, what legislation, what laws need
to be put in place, what reviews need to be made,
what needs to be taken to Parliament just to get
the legislation in law, and all that. You know,
negotiating at the government level to make sure
the right laws get passed.” - IGO/INGO-1
However, one non-state actor expressed frustration
with the pace of change suggesting that it had hindered
pharmacovigilance “because once it goes through Cabinet
they change many things so there are many things that I
have had to pull, because of these new changes as far as
governance goes to tweak implementation. I can’t imple-
ment it under the previous budget because of new laws!”
(IGO/NGO-5)
The IGO/INGOs key informants advocated for greater
accountability by pharmaceutical manufacturers because,
“industry is manufacturing medicines and releasing them
out to the market and thinks once it is sold…to them it is
done” (IGO/INGO-1). The need for greater industry ac-
countability was echoed by a pharmaceutical industry
key informant who reported that companies that
invested in pharmacovigilance were competing against
companies that did not; suggesting that self-regulation
was ineffective.
Despite Kenya’s adoption of global actors’ norms for
pharmacovigilance, key informants that were inter-
viewed asserted that the basis for engagement between
state and exogenous actors in Kenya was autonomy.
As such, they claimed that they merely ‘suggested’ pol-
icy, laws, regulations and norms for adoption. They
respected that “[low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs)] know where they are going” (IGO/INGO-5).
Rather than drive a specific agenda, key informants
claimed that they responded to requests for support
by local/national governments when they had overlap-
ping interests.
“We are aware that individual countries or
regions need to develop, like European
Commission did back when the European
Union did not have an EU-legislation on
pharmacovigilance. We also are aware that
this has to evolve.” – IGO/INGO-3
Exogenous actors’ engagement with the PPB was
largely consultative regarding setting pharmacovigilance
priorities “to determine what our focus areas really
should be and once determined, support aspects of
quality assurance of medicines issues and aspects of
ensuring that patient safety is optimal” (IGO/NGO-
1). Data anayzed from actors at the policy level
(government), implementation level (health facilities),
oversight level and the private sector showed that,
“agreed milestones and timelines of giving this
support” were established as a consequence of the
consultations (IGO/NGO-1). One key informant
stated that when meeting with the County Health
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Executive, “we were looking out for all of these things
together, the commitment they are making, and lis-
tening to the plans that they have and telling them
what we are looking out for and what we plan to do
in the future.” (IGO/NGO-1)
Kenya PPB, IGO and INGO key informants’ policy
preferences for pharmacovigilance are compared in
Table 4.
Some exogenous actors have engaged in collaborative
interactions with the counties to provide resources to
support greater ADR reporting and to facilitate dissem-
ination of ADR reports submitted.
“We normally support that because health care
workers report and the reports are laying [around] in
the facilities because they don’t necessarily have a
system of how they are getting to the Pharmacy and
Poisons Board. So that is both for ADRs and
reports for the whole country not just in certain
counties.” - IGO/INGO-5
Several key informants reported that IGO/INGOs’ advo-
cacy in Kenya was part of a broader agenda, to strengthen
pharmacovigilance regionally. A network of pharmacovigi-
lantes that have been trained in Kenya have been dele-
gated the responsibility to educate Kenya’s neighbours,
build local capacity for pharmacovigilance and advocate
for regional strengthening of pharmacovigilance systems.
PPB will be able to implement this agenda in their
capacity as a Regional Centre of Regulatory Excel-
lence (RCORE) for pharmacovigilance.
“Officers from PPB are part of our outreach strategy,
part of Pharmacovigilantes Sans Frontiers… and it’s
working. The more you can influence big countries the
more you use them to influence those around them.” -
IGO/INGO-3
Interactions hindering pharmacogovernance
Certain interactions negatively influenced pharmaco-
governance, specifically policies for ADR reporting
and corporate accountability for pharmacovigilance.
One key informant reported that the PPB sought
industry input regarding policy changes and was
responsive to industry requests. Industry input was
sought on the 2014 draft legislation to require each
pharmaceutical company to employ a qualified per-
son for pharmacovigilance (QPPV). Another inform-
ant reported that PPB “obviously wants to engage
with industry, wants collaboration, and wants our
input” (Pharma-1). The key informant reported fur-
ther that PPB had been responsive to previous re-
quests including a request to modify the schedule
for completing the Periodic Safety Update Report
(PSUR) to harmonize with the reporting schedule for
regulatory authorities in the European Union.
Table 3 The modes of engagement between domestic and exogenous actors and the effect on pharmacogovernance
Pharmacogovernance domains Modes of Engagement













Participation & Representation +/-
Equity & Inclusiveness (Distribution of
resources for pharmacovigilance)
+ +
Ethics (Policies to safeguard
patient interests)
+/-
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The patterns of engagement between exogenous and
domestic actors and their effect on the pharmacogo-
vernance domains are shown in Fig. 1.
Interactions strengthening pharmacovigilance
Non-state and external actors used the power of their
existing networks to advocate for the creation of new
networks for the purpose of mobilizing resources to
strengthen pharmacovigilance and active pharmacosur-
veillance. Pooling resources expanded capacity for phar-
macovigilance thus creating a better value for limited
donor dollars. The European Commission, WHO and
UMC worked with PPB to implement Cohort Event
Monitoring, “they provided seed money and they sup-
ported us to develop the clinical trials registry in collab-
oration with the Kenya Medical Institute” (PPB-2).
“We’ll pool [resources]. Like that Cohort Event
Monitoring program, the HIV and us…We work
together. They have put in some support or even
technical assistance for that. During the
implementation of that program we draw on that
money to support it. We also use the money from there
to train the sites”. - IGO/INGO-5
IGO/INGO advocacy contributed to developing a
cadre of advocates for pharmacovigilance whom they
nurtured and exposed to pharmacovigilance best prac-
tices and training to build confidence and compe-
tence. The term pharmacovigilantes was used to
describe individuals who advocated for pharmacovigi-
lance. The manner in which global actors courted
and nurtured the pharmacovigilantes is exemplified by
the following quote:
“In Kenya in particular, one of the key people we
identified very early on in Pharmacovigilantes Sans
Frontiers, we courted him and nurtured him… we
provided exposure to best practices outside and in
Kenya starting from way back in 2004 and started
sowing the seeds. So through our direct efforts
there is a pharmacovigilance centre and [it]
Fig. 1 Patterns of interactions between domestic and exogenous actors affecting pharmacovigilance
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became affiliated with the WHO program. And
now they’re one of the leading countries in
Africa.”- INGO/NGO-2
Interactions hindering pharmacovigilance
Some pharmaceutical companies’ actions to influence
Kenya’s draft legislation requiring a qualified person
for pharmacovigilance (QPPV) may negatively im-
pact both pharmacogovernance and pharmacovigi-
lance. The proposed legislation would require each
pharmaceutical company operating in Kenya to em-
ploy pharmacovigilance personnel. In the absence of
QPPV legislation, the multinational corporations
(MNCs) interviewed had assigned a single individual
to oversee more than 25 countries. One key inform-
ant was responsible for overseeing 42 African coun-
tries. Corporate decisions to appoint a regional head
for pharmacovigilance rather than a country head
and to oppose QPPV legislation impedes patient
safety and therefore contradicts beneficence.
“It’s impossible for a pharmaceutical company to have
a pharmacovigilance person, totally responsible for
pharmacovigilance in each country. So, they [PPB]
have [proposed] a stricter guideline which I have
written back and said we can’t do that.”- Pharma-1
The relationship between pharmacovigilance and pat-
terns of engagement between state and exogenous actors
is shown in Fig. 2.
Discussion
Pharmacogovernance and pharmacovigilance in Kenya
mirror other low- and middle income countries [1, 20, 22].
Many Sub-Saharan Africa countries lack a national
pharmacovigilance system, have limited infrastruc-
ture, human resources, training and capacity to de-
tect and analyze drug safety signals [20, 22]. A
survey of Sub-Saharan Africa countries found that
fewer than one third had laws and regulations to
mandate pharmacovigilance activities [20]. Pharma-
ceutical safety issues are not confined to regional
borders. Risks related to pharmaceutical consump-
tion are multi-jurisdictional because medicines are
produced and sold in a global marketplace [13].
Medicines manufactured in Kenya are marketed to
other countries in the East Africa Community and
medicines manufactured by multinational corpora-
tions are available for sale in Kenya. Network Gov-
ernance Theory suggests that under such conditions
policy actors will be motivated to come together in
order to contribute to shaping governance.
The research findings illuminate how Kenya’s govern-
ance, that permits delegation of authority to non-state
implementing partners, creates space for exogenous ac-
tors to influence normative policy, policy instruments
and practices that affect pharmacogovernance and
pharmacovigilance. Brass (2012), found that NGOs in
general are well integrated into Kenya’s governance and
the line between government policy makers and NGO
implementing partners is blurred.
Our semantic analyses showed that exogenous and
domestic actors’ perceptions of governance reflected
their divergent interests in shaping the direction of
pharmaceutical policy. Whereas IGO/INGOs linked
accountability with pharmacogovernance, and de-
scribed their actions to contribute to shared govern-
ance as a mechanism to advance pharmacovigilance
globally, some county actors and pharmaceutical
firms (domestic and MNC) perceived accountability
as the responsibility of others, such as the PPB. This
finding is significant in terms of drug safety and sug-
gests that stronger pharmacogovernance between
levels of government and among domestic and ex-
ogenous actors is needed. Despite differences in the
words attributed to governance expressed by sector
representatives, our finding that there was shared
interest in pharmacogovernance related to shaping
rule of law and harmonization of policies among
IGO/INGOs, PPB and pharmaceutical firms inter-
viewed is important. The implication of this finding
is that regulatory authorities, pharmaceutical firms
and global actors can converge around a common
solution (e.g., strengthening regulatory governance
for medicines safety) despite divergent problem def-
inition when interdependency is perceived to be
beneficial.
All of the key informants interviewed perceived
engagement among state, non-state or external ac-
tors was generally positive; likely because exogenous
actors’ priorities for pharmacovigilance were adopted
in tandem with domestic interests. Moreover, the
Pharmacy and Poisons Board exercised autonomy
over its choice to adapt or adopt suggested policy
norms. As an example, in designing its e-reporting
system, PPB adapted WHO norms for pharmacosur-
veillance by adding a feature for reporting suspected
poor quality medicine. PPB signaled its priority to
expand the definition of pharmacovigilance beyond
ADRs.
We found that in Kenya, pharmacogovernance and
pharmacovigilance are strengthened by fostering inter-
dependent engagement among county, national and ex-
ogenous actors. Specifically, engagement among the
Pharmacy and Poisons Board, Ministry of Health and ex-
ogenous actors based on collaboration and advocacy
favoured resource allocation by exogenous actors to sup-
port pharmacovigilance and reduce drug safety risk.
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Through engagement characterized as advocacy, govern-
ance networks comprised of domestic and exogenous ac-
tors are providing support for expansion of PPB’s
regulatory authority and amendments to the Food, Drug
and Chemical Substance Act and Pharmacy and Poisons
Act in order to strengthen pharmacogovernance. Neither
of the Acts included language on pharmacovigilance
when first passed.
The state-exogenous actors’ relationship regarding
the pharmacogovernance domain ‘Policy, Law, and
Regulation’ was mostly positive, however this study
found efforts by some exogenous actors to limit
regulatory reforms. Pharmaceutical industry consulta-
tions with PPB, that aimed to discourage adoption of
requirements for a QPPV on the grounds that the
policy was unnecessary and too costly, impeded
pharmacovigilance.
We argue that pharmacovigilance may also be hin-
dered by exogenous actors’ policy preferences for the
harmonization of regulatory requirements for drug
registration because the aim of policies promoted by
the AMRH and the EAC is to reduce trade barriers
rather than pharmacovigilance [7, 41]. Although this
study found convergence in key informants’ percep-
tions of regulatory harmonization, regardless of the
sector they represented, the benefits of regulatory
harmonization have been contested in the literature
due to the trend to harmonize to the lowest standard
rather than raise regulatory requirements, even in
high income countries [42, 43].
Fig. 2 Patterns of interactions between domestic and exogenous actors affecting pharmacogovernance
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Some of the deficits that were found in the pharma-
cogovernance were not overcome by state-exogenous
actors’ engagement. We did not find evidence that
exogenous actors influenced legislation to address the
lack of resources for pharmacovigilance. However, we
found strong engagement among exogenous actors
that had a positive effect on mobilizing donor re-
sources for pharmacovigilance. Interdependent and
dependent engagement led to resource allocation for
active pharmacosurveillance (e.g., CEM and TSR) as
well as innovations in data collection and risk com-
munication (e.g., e-reporting and mobile phone apps).
Donor support for pharmacovigilance was commonly
cited as critical by key informants because resources
available for pharmacovigilance are limited in Kenya
and other LMICs [20, 44, 45]. Exogenous actors
including USAID, MSH, WHO, Global Fund, and
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation have rec-
ommended multi-sectoral engagement as a mechan-
ism to expand resources for pharmacovigilance in
resource-limited settings. Stakeholder coordination
was likely strong because a sector-wide approach
to development has been widely promoted by the
neoliberal agenda since early 2000 [46]. We did
not investigate whether certain global actors had
more influence on pharmacogovernance than others
however, the literature suggests that technical and
financial support from transnational policy actors is
an incentive for the uptake of policy ideas in
under-resourced LMI countries [47]. Thus, exo-
genous actors that offer financial and technical
resources may have the greatest influence on phar-
macogovernance in Kenya.
Conclusions
The research advances our understanding of the
patterns of engagement between state and non-state
actors pertaining to pharmacogovernance and phar-
macovigilance. The literature on Network Governance
Theory and risk governance posits that responsibility
for managing risk should be shared between state
and non-state actors [48, 49]. Our finding that
domestic and exogenous actors contributed to phar-
macogovernance through positive interdependent
engagement is consistent with Network Governance
Theory, which advances that multiple stakeholders’
varied perspectives expands the characterization of
risk and the solutions that are considered. The re-
search may be transferable particularly in regards to
findings that indicate that the global policy commu-
nity can support domestic policy actors’ efforts to
strengthen pharmacovigilance in Sub-Saharan Africa
through participation in governance networks. A
global funding model could further advance national
pharmacovigilance if funding is targeted to strengthen
pharmacogovernance through the development of a na-
tional pharmacovigilance system; resource distribution for
equitable pharmacosurveillance and the development of a
nationwide risk communication network for rapid dissem-
ination of drug safety information.
A framework for assessing pharmacogovernance
would support policy makers’ evidence-based de-
cision making regarding investments to strengthen
capacity for pharmacovigilance; important when re-
sources are limited [1, 50]. It would also support
policy to address inequities in pharmacovigilance
particularly in rural geographic regions that are
disproportionately disadvantaged; having fewer hos-
pitals and pharmacosurveillance units than urban
centres [1, 22, 50].
The research results suggest that caution is war-
ranted regarding the sole use of exogenous actors
to fill a deficit in capacity for pharmacovigilance. It
leaves Kenya vulnerable to: 1) a fragmented phar-
macovigilance system; 2) ad hoc, drug specific phar-
macosurveillance; 3) cross purpose interests; and 4)
exogenous actors’ shifting priorities. For although
exogenous actors are likely to continue to advocate
for pharmacovigilance while interests align, Kenya is
already experiencing the effect of shifting priorities
that have reduced donor funding. Whereas key in-
formants interviewed recognized Kenya’s autonomy
to adopt global actors’ norms, less consideration
was given to donors’ autonomy to determine to
whom to provide their resources and support.
Therefore, the research suggests that the strength-
ening pharmacogovernance amongst national and
subnational government levels will best advance
postmarket drug safety in low- and middle income
countries.
Limitations and future research
The key informants interviewed for this study rep-
resent an information-rich sample of policy makers
in IGO/INGOs, government and pharmaceutical
firms in Kenya. The data collected represent a
range of views pertaining to state and exogenous
actor engagement that is limited to pharmacogover-
nance. We were unable to interview representatives
from the faith-based sector. Although data provided
in interviews about this sector were reported in the
literature reviewed and the documents analyzed,
additional studies are suggested to capture the per-
spectives of representatives from the faith-based
sector. Additional studies are needed to evaluate
whether the study findings are transferable to other
sectors where state/non-state governance networks
operate.
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